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The basic idea of my proposal is to explore the historical background that led to 
the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, focusing on the underpinnings and reasoning behind 
neoconservative ideology.  The central question of this project is: To what extent has 
neoconservatism, within a historical context taking into account its origins and evolution, 
been used to rationalize foreign policy in recent history, eventually leading to the war in 
Iraq? The analysis focuses primarily on statements of official groups, as well as historical 
documents and literature that trace the origins of the neoconservative movement. 
Literature coming from the post-World War II period through the Cold War is analyzed 
in search of information relating to the development of the neoconservative ideology. The 
contemporary rationale for policy is analyzed, measured against the founding and 
subsequently evolving principles of the movement, as articulated by the leaders and those 
who have supervised the implementation of the philosophy. Research results in 
qualitative generalizations derived from an archival examination of primary and 
secondary documents and other media from the time periods of approximately the 1940s 
to the present. Analysis conducted explores the hypothesis that historical events relating 
to U.S. policy abroad and the presentation of these events at home have manifested 

















The overall objective of this research is to critically examine the ideology of 
neoconservatism and the real impact that its principles have had on the U.S. following the 
eventual decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003. The central question of this project is: 
How has neoconservatism, within a historical context, been articulated and used in U.S. 
foreign policy? This question also relates to the placement of neoconservatism within 
American political ideology, and its relation to traditional conservatism, and is rooted in 
the precepts of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003.  The purpose of this examination is to 
explore the history that manifested itself implicitly through the actions of military 
officials, which were strongly rooted in the actions of previous thinkers and theorists in 
twentieth century America. My hypothesis on this topic relates to the general ahistoricism 
practiced by the media and the American public in failing to recognize patterns of 
intellectual thought manifested in recent history. My initial judgment is that thorough 
analysis needs to place the movement in its most veracious context. The reasons for my 
undertaking of this research are to establish a base of information around this highly 
successful movement that explains its real impact and background, and that provides 
insight into the functioning of our democracy. This is, I will admit, a seemingly broad 
interpretation of the importance of these issues, but such an interpretation is rendered 
necessary considering that foreign policy actions conducted, specifically in Iraq, reflect 
world opinion of the United States and determine the immediate course of American 
politics. The perceptions generated through the presentation of foreign policy actions that 
may have resulted from the ideology of neoconservatism have contributed to 
conservatism and the political climate in incalculable fashion. The research methods I 
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used included practices to gain and interpret knowledge in the context appropriate for this 
project. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
My research design was made up of general archival research tactics and 
hermeneutical methodology that allowed me the ability to compile information without 
coming to problems that could result from a research design based on more specific and 
singular methods. Utilizing archival and interpretive research methods essentially means 
using various forms of media to compile relevant information from secondary and 
primary source material to historiographies of particular events. Primary sources, for the 
purposes of this project, being a review largely of information and opinion in the context 
of the time it was written, are those documents and materials that were written by 
someone asserting a viewpoint in direct response to policies and phenomena of the time. 
Secondary sources, again for the purposes of this research, are defined as those which 
comment or analyze from a contextual viewpoint themselves, and which may or may not 
have ideological biases, but which assert viewpoints based on informed historical 
perspective. The data collected is not a random selection of materials, as there are 
specific arenas in which I chose to focus, and in which certain ideological biases on my 
part had a qualitative influence on the selection and accession of materials.  
With specific regard to the accession of materials, I employed various strategies 
in order to access materials. One strategy consisted of examining primary documents to 
determine specific facts, and then using that single piece of information to expand the 
project to cover this single aspect. This type of contextual research was a method 
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employed consistently in my research. Patterns in various forms make up a significant 
part of the data retrieval and analysis in a project such as this. The shape of the patterns 
also includes factors such as assumptions, as the issue of neoconservatism is rife with 
implicit projections and inherent beliefs about United States policy and military 
projections. The presence of these assumptions was essential to recognize toward a 
deeper understanding of the context I sought to establish around the issues under 
exploration. The primary avenues to collect information online were databases through 
library websites, where I was able to utilize keyword searches and subject headings in 
order to narrow the large topical areas of discussion down to manageable areas. 
 
Neoconservatism: A Background 
 Neoconservatism is a twentieth century American political construct that has 
asserted itself on the grandest stage imaginable with the current policy in Iraq. It is at its 
most basic in support of the global leadership and military superiority of the United 
States and essentially is against all that may temper this leadership and dominance. 
Considering the pervasiveness of this “ideology,” if one is in fact inclined to term it as 
such given the disconnection between the initial philosophy and its present 
implementation, there is surprisingly little in the way of pronouncements and the like as 
far as a quantifiable introduction to neoconservatism as a concept. Dissimilar to broad 
international, philosophical, and social movements, no charter or organization has acted 
as a liaison to disseminate information about coming political action, at least in the 
decades leading up to the post-Cold War period. The term originates from Michael 
Harrington, a socialist, who applied the term in 1970 to former leftists who decided to 
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partake in the rightward revolution spearheaded by the election of Richard Nixon.1 
Though that description was satirical in its application of the prefix “neo” to describe 
conservatives who had changed ideologies, a slightly more serious one-phrase description 
is Irving Kristol’s assertion that a neoconservative is a liberal “mugged by reality,” reality 
in his sense being the fallacy of “Great Society” liberalism as well as of compassionate 
interventionism in foreign affairs with a de-emphasis on the propagation of American 
supremacy. Examples of such interventionism include the disastrous defense of South 
Vietnam, and later as a prelude to Iraq, skirmishes such as the ineffective, at least to the 
ends of hegemony, incursions in Bosnia and Somalia.2 The one individual most who 
represents the public presence of the ideology independent of academic and theoretical 
models is Irving Kristol, whose published collection of writings, The Autobiography of 
an Idea, spans his intellectual development and his conversion from a postwar liberal to a 
new type of hard-line ideologue, and who was a constant influence and citation in my 
review of neoconservative literature. Robert Kagan, a frequent collaborator with Irving 
Kristol’s son William, told journalist George Packer, “I am a liberal, in foreign policy. 
The conservative tradition in foreign policy is the minimalist, realist tradition.”3 
Neoconservatism, along these convoluted lines and for the moment citing two of its most 
prominent proponents, is an ideology which differs from traditional economic and social 
conservatism and which supports military and cultural strength to the end of expansive 
American leadership. This ideology was disseminated from a very close-knit group of 
individuals, united by thoughts and proposals about the world. The volume of 
information that exists is daunting to anyone seeking to maintain any consistency in a 
                                                 
1 Midge Decter, “Neocon Memoir ,” American Jewish History 87, nos. 2-3 (1999), http://muse.jhu.edu.  
2 Michael Mandelbaum, “The Reluctance to Intervene” Foreign Policy 95, (Summer,1994) , p. 3-18. 
3 George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005), 19. 
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portrayal of this subject matter, and further conclusions and citation of individuals will 
occur in following paragraphs.   
 
Theoretical Underpinnings – Leo Strauss 
 Neoconservatism is at its core a theory, which presents the rather unique 
challenge of defining a contemporary ideology along theoretical lines as opposed to 
analysis of specific policy positions. The issue of an underlying theory is not one that 
frequently crops up when discussing recent policy action or involvement in foreign 
affairs. The contrast between the two Iraq invasions illustrates this well. Consider that the 
1991 Persian Gulf War was an action in direct response to the invasion of Kuwait by 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army. Within a very short time, the George H.W. Bush 
administration restored stability to the region. Nothing particularly theoretical played out; 
realist solutions were generated to deal with an immediate problem, toward highly 
specific ends. Contrast this with “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 2003. The most striking 
thing about this war was that it was not only directly unprovoked, but based on 
assumptions and strategic models. It was not a realist reaction to suit immediate political 
needs, and any immediate reasons were famously later determined fallacious. According 
to Chaim Kaufmann, former Undersecretary of Defense and highly placed 
neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz “came close to admitting as much in May 2003 when he 
stated ‘We settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of 
mass destruction, as the core reason.’”4  In this case, then, something other than the 
immediacy of the threat of economic and human loss was at work before the 
                                                 
4 Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 
29, no. 1(Summer 2004), http://muse.jhu.edu.  
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commencement of the Iraq war in 2003. This something was a theory; an idea about the 
world that asserted that this particular foreign policy action would result in an 
organization of policy and power that conformed most tightly to the parameters of this 
theory. A great many have written on the nature of this operation being theoretical and 
the work of the mysterious “neocon cabal,” to borrow a term from New York Times 
columnist David Brooks; however the question remains: what were the theories that 
informed the creation of this intellectual movement? Exactly what is it about them that 
make them so seemingly undecipherable and mysterious? Much of this information has 
remained hidden due to a number of factors led by intellectual laziness; however defining 
neoconservatism as a theory and analyzing the major thinkers cited in secondary 
literature as the movement’s original progenitors should not be regarded as such an 
impenetrably dense grouping of thought as to be impossible to unravel.  
 Leo Strauss, the famously inscrutable University of Chicago professor, is 
undoubtedly at the heart of what can be considered the origins of “neoconservative 
theory,” considering the adoption of his ideology by many neoconservative progenitors 
and the pervasive citations of his work in modern discussions of neoconservatism. A 
German Jewish émigré informed heavily by his homeland’s tumult following World War 
I, his views were complex and largely confined to his own intellectual circles. His theory 
is about as dense as can be imagined because of its holistic approach to the history of 
human philosophy; however certain tenets of his thought are consistent and unique, 
according to the secondary literature published on Strauss’ writings, and reveal the extent 
to which he has influenced modern neoconservatism.  
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Leo Strauss’ views in opposition to liberalism in general represent the roots of the 
traditional neoconservative attack on the social policies of the mid-twentieth century. He 
believed that the American construct of liberalism, meaning a religiously and 
philosophically pluralistic society that instills great trust in agency and capability of the 
average person, was dangerous and a part of the nihilist tradition. Nihilism, from Strauss’ 
vantage, leads to a general devaluing of religion and the aspects of culture which hold 
society together.5 This view represents a fundamental attack on the fabric of American 
society as defined by its founding documents asserting the vitality of diverse and 
decentralized expressions of religion and ideology. It is not difficult for a reader to see 
the inherent conflict that Strauss’ opposition to modern liberalism would have with the 
majority of American policy, particularly the increase in social welfare and other such 
programs. Through such a basic understanding, one can approach his more complex 
views in the appropriate context. 
Strauss’ contribution to the theoretical approach to knowledge and intelligence in 
neoconservatism represents a significant and applicable link from philosophy to ideology. 
The modern public image of neoconservatives as something of a secret society, as is 
frequently espoused by critics of neoconservatism, describing those cut off from the 
general American discourse, is very likely a result of Strauss’ theories of intellectualism. 
Strauss’ at his most basic calls for a return to antiquity, often to the knowledge of 
thinkers from Plato to Germany’s Carl Schmitt, who he saw as inherently covert 
operators who required the analysis of an informed few to determine the true beliefs of 
                                                 
5 Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
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these thinkers.6 Strauss was himself regarded as Neo-Platonic, because of his concurrence 
with Plato’s famous belief in the “noble lie,” that being the lie told to the masses for their 
own end benefit.7 The lie-tellers in this construct are the intellectual and philosophical 
elite, who for Strauss included his stable of “Straussians,” his students. Strauss obviously 
did not regard just anyone as worthy of the altar of truth; in fact he may have deliberately 
obfuscated his views to those whom he did not see as in line with his philosophies.8 Such 
paranoia can be understood by an analysis of Strauss as influenced by his fear of the rise 
of oppressive ideologies as in his homeland.  Strauss’ beliefs regarding the presence of an 
educated few making the judgments that truly matter is a theme echoed by Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, a former Democratic Senator from New York and frequently cited 
neoconservative proponent, who stated the general viewpoint that public information, 
though available to be decoded by anyone, was in fact “expert’s art, and thus the 
knowledge private.”9 This philosophical tenet has within it the seeds of what makes 
neoconservatism in its modern and historical constructs seem so clandestine; it is an 
explicit part of the acknowledged influences of neoconservatism that there is really no 
such thing as knowledge appropriate for public interpretation and action; the ability to see 
beyond what is most basic is a task best left to the experts who are able to do the 
interpretation its justice. There is thus a fundamental conflict here between the 
individualistic liberty and intellectualism of the type espoused by those as diverse as John 
                                                 
6 Jürgen Gebhardt, “Leo Strauss: The Quest for Truth in Times of Perplexity,” from Hannah Arendt and 
Leo Straus: German Emigrės and American Political Thought after World War II, (New York: Press 
Syndicate, 1995), 81. 
7 Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 58. 
8 Timothy Fuller, “Reflections on Leo Strauss and American Education,” from from Hannah Arendt and 
Leo Straus: German Emigrės and American Political Thought after World War II, (New York: Press 
Syndicate, 1995), 61.   
9 Alfonso J. D’amico, “Impractical America: Reconsideration of the Pragmatic Lesson,” Political Theory 
14, no. 1 (Feb. 1986): 97. http://www.jstor.org.  
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Stuart Mill and Antonio Gramsci and the detached elitism of Strauss. According to Irving 
Kristol, “he was contemptuous of the modern demagogic idolatry of the common man.”10 
It is possible for a reader of literature on the subject to draw a line to the neoconservative 
position on Iraq, as the process of taking the ideology of the neoconservative position to 
the American people or even to the United States Congress with full veracity was almost 
assuredly not done nor seemingly considered a viable option by neoconservative figures. 
Neoconservatives, then, are intellectual elite in this sense, those who will potentially 
make the decisions for mankind that the average person is incapable of considering fully. 
The Straussian approach to intellectualism was applied by neoconservatives in their 
approach to Iraq, wherein they implicitly utilized other theoretical tenets of Strauss.      
 The broad application of Straussian thought is apparent in U.S. conduct in Iraq if 
a reader understands the most salient aspects of Strauss’ views on societal solidarity. 
Strauss’ legacy is of opposition to modern liberal democracy, tyranny, and in the case of 
Iraq, “the primacy of the regime to shaping the way of life of the city.”11 The connection 
to the idea of regime change has been made by neoconservatives in the wake of the US 
invasion of Iraq, however such a direct connection between Strauss and Saddam may not 
be salient; the real significance is based in Strauss’ beliefs about the inherent problems 
with diversity of though with respect to the centrality of national unity. The assumption 
of American supremacy inherent in neoconservatism and the ability to project this to 
maximum effect must be predicated on a state with great solidarity, as allowance for 
pluralistic forms of dissent erodes unity and allows for enemies to emerge who challenge 
the order of the good. According to Klaus J. Milich, this view is heavily informed by 
                                                 
10 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 8. 
11 Kenneth R. Weinstein, “Philosophic Roots, The Role of Leo Strauss, and the War in Iraq,” from The 
Neocon Reader, ed. by Irwin Stelzer (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 206. 
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Strauss’ German Jewish background, as the Weimar republic of his youth did not, in 
Strauss’ view, do an acceptable job of tempering the presence of Nazis and 
Communists.12 This is significant in that in Strauss’ time, when he was at his influential 
peak with his students, the threat of revolution and opposing competing ideologies 
presented themselves manifestly in comparison to recent times.  It is difficult for the 
passive consumer of contemporary politics to make connections between the Weimar 
Republic of Strauss’ youth and regime change in Iraq; however the recognition of such a 
relationship to the Straussian legacy must be the focus of a genuine historical analysis of 
neoconservatism and the role that Leo Strauss’ views on political society played in these 
events.  
 When examining Strauss in the hopes of determining his influence on 
neoconservatism, it is important to separate the classical philosophical notions of his 
works from the modern application that has relevance to the topic at hand. Strauss was 
first and foremost a philosopher, a man interested in the whole history of human thought 
and who carried with him influences far too diverse to deconstruct in the hopes of 
determining one specific viewpoint on contemporary issues of social policy and foreign 
relations. The linking of Strauss to neoconservatives often functions to perpetuate the 
neoconservative mythology, as in much of the references made to him in literature 
opposing to the war in Iraq, which allows individuals to invoke simply the terms 
“Neocon” or “Straussian” and believe they understand the underpinnings of 
neoconservatism. It is difficult to imagine the apathetic and frequently uninformed 
                                                 
12 Klaus J. Milich, “Fundamentalism Hot and Cold George W. Bush and the ‘Return of the Sacred,’” 
Cultural Critique 62, no. 1 (2006): 104. http://muse.jhu.edu .   
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American public being able to comprehend the minutiae and subsequent influence of a 
dense intellectual theory such as that of Leo Strauss. However, as long as an attendant 
part of Straussian ideology is as present as it has been in American political action, such 
information attains the level of import. Theory, of course leads to its application to 
thought to modern schema, and the application of theory in the case of neoconservatism, 
though certainly not entirely informed by Straussian ideology, began its ascent following 
World War II as the long period of the Cold War in world politics began. The recognition 
of Straussian theory as such rather than as a road map or bible of neoconservatives is to 
understand the indirect and complex role that Strauss has played in modern 
neoconservatism. 
 
A Brief History of Literature 
 Neoconservative writings, evidenced by an analysis of their substance and 
frequency, have been a consistent and influential part of American politics for decades. If 
discussed at all, there are certain inherent qualities of neoconservatism in its original 
forms that are regarded as givens by modern discourses in political literature. These 
include the qualities of disaffected liberalism and the American immigrant form of 
Judaism, which infuses much of the literature produced up until idea became action in the 
1970’s. In addition, the themes of anti-communism, opposition to the New Left and the 
radicalism of the 60’s and 70’s, and the increasing support of American hegemony 
leading up to the 1990’s are fruitful areas of neoconservative thought in the post-World 
War II period. 
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The Jewish origins of neoconservatism, cited often by modern writers, often are 
referenced in opposition to perceived elitism. The base reality is, despite the voluminous 
rhetoric, that neoconservatism is at its origins a product of Eastern Jewish intellectuals. 
The origins of neoconservatism as a critical discourse in American can be traced to and 
through Irving Kristol given the singularly revealing documentation he has shared in his 
attempts to acquit neoconservatism as an effective and credible ideology. There were 
certainly others involved in the initial stages of the formation of the ideology; however 
Kristol is one who has made clear his lineage and his explicit role in the genesis of the 
established form of published neoconservative ideology. His personal intellectual history, 
detailed in The Autobiography of an Idea, reveals the importance of Commentary 
magazine, a publication traditionally focused on issues of the Jewish community. The 
publication was essentially a Jewish intellectual journal increasingly radicalized by a new 
group of thinkers that were decidedly the products of their time and collective social 
histories as Leninists and Straussians, according to biographical information. The explicit 
Zionism and ideological opposition to the Islamic societies which surround Israel that 
typify much of the more modern neoconservative rhetoric obviously have their roots in 
these writings13; however initially this shared history seemed to have more of an effect on 
the small group of people who began to dominate this publication. Commentary not only 
provided an outlet for Zionist frustrations, but also began the developments of virulent 
anti-Communism that would remain a hallmark of neoconservatism.  
The anti-Communism amongst neoconservatives was influenced primarily by the 
capitalist-socialist discourse which still dominated much social theory at the time, and 
Kristol’s frequent ultimatums regarding the necessity of stamping out opposing economic 
                                                 
13 Review of Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America, http://muse.jhu.edu.  
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and social ideologies, present in The Autobiography of an Idea, are a strong component 
of the zero-sum approach that neoconservatism is renowned for. To cite but one famous 
example, Kristol commented in 1952: “For there is one thing that the American people 
know about Senator McCarthy; he, like them, is unequivocally anti-Communist. About 
the spokesman for American liberalism, they feel they know no such thing.” 14 The 
emergence of Commentary as an increasingly noteworthy publication gave the 
ideological proponents of the new neoconservative principles the opportunity to 
participate in greater proportion in national political discussion; however the mainstream 
acceptance or even awareness of neoconservatism was not understood fully outside its 
own limited circles.  
 Leading out of the incubation period in the 1940’s, largely in Eastern intellectual 
circles, which was led by the Jewish intellectuals and the proponents of broad anti-
Communism, other general themes emerged which drew from the events occurring in the 
world. The resistance to left-wing activism by students and expounders against traditional 
US practices was typified by work such as Midge Decter’s “Letter to the Young (and to 
their parents).” The wife and mother of neoconservatives Norman and John Podhoretz, 
respectively, she railed against the “age of Aquarius” in mostly predictable, general 
terms. The areas of American social society and the Cold War will later be explored in 
greater detail; however other areas of opposition made themselves present with the 
emergence of what has been termed “global civil society” in the 1970’s. The 
multinational flavor of this new movement was opposed by those such as Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, who railed against the UN Resolution drafted at the global Women’s 
Conference in the mid 1970’s which was interpreted by him and others to state that 
                                                 
14Ronald Radosh, “The Legacy of the Anti-Communist Liberal Intellectuals,” Partisan Review 67, no. 4. 
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Zionism was a form of racism.15 Throughout such specific events, the literature reveals 
that neoconservatives maintained their academic focus, often discussing esoteric notions 
about American history and democracy absent the prisms of current events; a luxury 
afforded an ideology that did not carry with it the responsibility of acting out policy 
officially. This would of course change when neoconservatives rose to positions of power 
in the 1970’s and directly participated in Cold War policy. 
Following the concurrent fall of Reaganism and Soviet Communism from power 
in the early 1990’s, neoconservatives attempted throughout the 1990’s to return to the 
period of decisiveness the 1980’s had brought and where their goals were most in reach.16 
Unrest in Latin America, the rise of extremist Islamists in Iran and the greater Islamic 
world, and the continued battles with the USSR throughout the period created a scenario 
by which the neoconservative ideology of American supremacy reached peak salience. 
The lack of idealistic solidarity and the inherent tumult that these other powers wrought, 
not to mention the fear they instilled in the American people, created the scenario by 
which an ideology advocating broad military supremacy made great strides. The end of 
the Cold War and the ending of the Republican administrations which had a willingness 
to employ and give credence to neoconservatives, led to the need of neoconservatism to 
assert its new course.17  This new course of modern neoconservatism has become a 
hotbed of controversy as it has led into the 2003 Iraq incursion, however it is necessary to 
explore the historical progenitors and provide insight into the past events which, have 
influence on decision making whether appropriately documented and acknowledged or 
                                                 
15 Peter Beinart, “Wrong Man for the UN,” Washington Post, March 22, 2005, page A17.  
16 Robert Kagan “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 1996), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276&prog=zgp&proj=zusr.   
17 Ibid. 
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not. The brightest and most directly relevant of these progenitors is the specific policies 
with which the neoconservatives approached the USSR, which as previously mentioned 
were undertaken in the 1970’s with respect to direct policy action.   
   
Neoconservatism and the Cold War 
 Neoconservatism, as its influences go, is intertwined with the Cold War, and more 
specifically the hard-line American approach to dealing with the USSR, as is 
demonstrated in numerous works of neoconservative proponents. While issues at home 
such as the antiwar movement regarding Vietnam and the counterrevolution of Richard 
Nixon certainly galvanized the neoconservatives, the Cold War was the event that shaped 
the formulation of policies designed to project the maximum of American power in the 
face of direct threat. The actual implementation of policymaking apparatuses in the case 
of the Cold War in the 1970s differed from the previous analytical and philosophical 
works produced by the neoconservatives, and thus represents the first direct application 
of what can be termed neoconservative theory into policy. Ideas regarding Cold War 
policy and neoconservatism, similarly to the present manifestations of neoconservatism 
in Iraq, may have some basis in reality; however there exist revealing ways in which 
neoconservatives approached the Cold War. The reliance on a theoretical model in 
opposition to objectivity and realism carries explicit comparison to events in Iraq, a 
conclusion that can be derived from an examination of official policy apparatuses, 
primarily Team B. 
Team B, a Ford-era group that represented the neoconservative tenets with respect 
to policy towards the USSR, was commissioned by CIA director George H.W. Bush, 
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more because of criticism that his agency was “ failing to give enough weight to darker 
interpretations of Soviet intentions,”18 than because he believed in the cause of the anti-
Soviet crusaders. This new group would provide information on the darker side of Soviet 
intentions, whether or not it found credible evidence. The immediate reaction of the anti-
Soviet hard liners was caused in large part by the foreign policy reign of Henry Kissinger, 
principal bête-noir of the neoconservative persuasion. Kissinger’s approach of 
nonabrasive personal politics with regard to the Cold War undermined the necessity of 
winning the epic battle for humanity that the Cold War represented to neoconservatives.19 
Team B was in many substantive ways similar to the modern movement to instigate war 
against Saddam Hussein; though obviously in the case of the Cold War the plans and/or 
threats of Team B and the Committee on the Present Danger were unrealized.  
Team B’s origins are most instructive to an understanding of the groups context 
and modern parallels. Team B was suggested and or/insisted upon by a group of virulent 
anti-communists led by Albert Wohlsetter of the University of Chicago. Wohlsetter had 
been a student of Leo Strauss just a few decades previous, and Wohlsetter himself 
mentored a new generation of neoconservatives, most notably Paul Wolfowitz. 
Wolfowitz ended up on the ten-member board of Team B, recommended by Zionist 
future anti-Soviet hawk Richard Perle, which produced criticisms that the CIA was mired 
in a failure of intelligence rooted in over reliance on technology rather than the rhetoric 
of Soviet leaders.20 The effect of this action was the setting of an official precedent that 
                                                 
18 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans (New York: Penguin, 2004), 73.   
19 Henry Kissinger, “Between the Old Left and the New Right, Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999), 
http://www-stage.foreignaffairs.org/19990501faessay983/henry-a-kissinger/between-the-old-left-and-the-
new-right.html.   
20 See Don Oberdorfer, “Report Saw Soviet Buildup for War,” CIA declassifies Controversial 1976 “Team 
B” Analysis, Washington Post, October 12, 1992, p.A11. 
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allowed open questioning of the CIA whenever Team B saw fit to challenge the agency’s 
coloring of foreign threats. Wolfowitz revealingly stated later: “Team B demonstrated 
that it was possible to construct a sharply different view of Soviet motivation from the 
consensus view of the analysts.”21 Richard Pipes, an accomplished and award-winning 
historian of pre-Soviet Russia and the 1917 Revolution, also became a part of the group, 
though his credentials as a neoconservative and his motivations are far murkier than 
Wohlsetter’s and the other hard-liners that advocated Team B’s actions. Richard Pipes’ 
opposition to the Soviets may be due to his disdain for the Soviet experiment’s 
disconnect from Russia’s grand history; his son Daniel has essentially taken him one step 
further by advocating against militant Islam a “tough, indeed aggressive stance to 
undermine or eradicate the militants and the states that supposedly fostered them.”22 That 
Pipes’ son would adopt such neoconservative rhetoric is emblematic of both the familial 
ties in neoconservatism’s origins and the relationship between American policy toward 
the USSR and the subsequent similar policy toward the Middle East following September 
11, 2001. Such direct personal connections in the genesis of Team B underscore the 
relationship that the fight against Soviet tyranny in this instance has with the similar 
movement to reestablish American power vis-à-vis Iraq.  
The group’s output is of course the quantifiable aspect of any relationship to 
neoconservatism and Iraq. The team’s mission, though not through the official channels 
of announcements and public relations in keeping with the culture of public and media 
that permeates neoconservatism, was to drum up marginally relevant charges against the 
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USSR as representing a battle-ready stance. The intensity of the USSR’s commitment to 
military readiness and close competition with the United States have rarely if ever been in 
doubt by analysts and even critics of Team B, however there is little to suggest that any 
of Team B’s findings were valid with respect to imminent nuclear threat. The veracity of 
the reports is best illustrated by an observation of Team B’s analysis of the Soviet 
ideology of militarism, which lazily cherry picked quotes from Marxist and Leninist 
literature, showing both a lack of scholarship and the utilization of similar tactics to the 
purported polar opposite of American goodness, the Soviets themselves.23   The notion of 
Team B’s neoconservatives that the original analysis and intelligence work of the CIA 
was fatally flawed and coming from a minimalist, non hostile position is consistent with 
the ways in which mainstream intelligence regarding Iraq was misrepresented; one of the 
most glaring of many examples being the claim that Iraq had attempted to acquire 
uranium from Africa.24 Team B represents a historical reference point to modern 
neoconservatism extremely effectively because of such similarities.  
 The modern incarnations of neoconservatism, illustrated by the previous case of 
Daniel Pipes and many other such generation-gap bridging neoconservatives such as 
William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and John Podhoretz, son of Irving Kristol collaborator 
Norman Podhoretz at Commentary25, have effectively used cold-war rhetoric and 
replaced the USSR as the enemy with the much more amorphous and ambiguous concept 
of terror, and the Middle East in particular. This allows for a resurgence of Commentary-
era Zionism, considering Israel’s position in the midst of radical Islam, however the 
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salience of the connection between the Cold War of the 1970’s and the perceived 
unipolar but increasingly globalized scene of today has presented the types of problems 
that may be intrinsic to the application of a mostly unchanging ideology to alternate 
circumstances. However, neoconservatism has not been entirely confined to the area of 
broad foreign policy. The integration with social conservatism and its attendant modern 
reliance on the principles of Christian fundamentalism is an unavoidable aspect of the 
neoconservative ideology that warrants exploration.  
 
Neoconservatism, Conservatism, and American Society   
The ideology of neoconservatism is by no means restricted to foreign policy, and 
certainly by no means restricted to conduct regarding the nation of Iraq. The aspects of 
neoconservatism dealing with American culture relate to the simultaneous rise of the 
religious right along with the supremacist foreign policy goals of neoconservatism on a 
global scale. Much of this work was something of a side project to the large scale goals of 
global prominence, but the consistency with which traditionally defined neoconservative 
thinkers viewed social and cultural issues adds these areas as a part of neoconservative 
ideology.  Influential culture related works were published long before any manifestation 
and implementation of the ideology on world affairs had taken place.  
The role of American primacy is central to cultural observations and 
recommendations by neoconservatives, and represents the most truly “conservative,” in 
the traditional sense, aspect of the neoconservative mind. It seems that the underlying 
theoretical assumption that America is in a position of unprecedented power, influence, 
and righteousness is predicated on the society being desirable; neoconservatives 
 21
frequently champion the American forms of democratic freedom. These views, as can be 
demonstrated from literature review, are clearly at odds with policies of social welfare 
and aid. Irving Kristol makes several stunning claims in a short essay titled The 
Conservative Welfare State. He advocates discrimination as “absolutely necessary” as a 
part of welfare reform, and states that men “have no entitlement whatever to welfare.”26 
Kristol believes in Social Security and Medicare; however he feels that the welfare is to 
be applied on a highly specified basis, which makes gender discrimination part of the 
explicit policy of the federal government. Traditional conservative opposition to social 
welfare is supported by neoconservatism in that it erodes national unity and consequently 
American primacy. 
 Neoconservatives in general oppose social welfare and civil rights, and the use of 
candid rhetoric detailing the damage these policies can do indicates the deep 
conservatism and opposition to liberalism inherent in these views. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan stated explicitly the problem he feels that black America poses to the 
continuance of effectively dominant American institutions. He asserts, “The family 
structure of lower class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many urban centers is 
approaching complete breakdown.”27 It is important to note that Moynihan in 1996 voted 
against the implementation of the Welfare Reform act that codified his earlier stance, 
though his influence is significant given the citations of his work in this area.28 This type 
of rhetoric, absent the employment of anachronistic terminology, is not dissimilar to the 
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ideology that has been espoused ever since the civil rights era by conservative politicians. 
It is however, important to make the distinction with the Southern democrats who 
similarly converted to a new conservatism around this era; such individuals are not 
neoconservatives, and neither are the religiously motivated Republicans of the 1980’s. 
The public confluence of neoconservatism with such groups is perhaps a product of the 
misleading nature of the term itself; neoconservatives are not simply the new form of 
prototypical conservatives in America, but rather a specific subset of ideologues. Quite 
clearly, however, the neoconservative position of making explicit reference to the 
problem areas in denouncing the social welfare of the civil rights era placed 
neoconservatism further and further from the left as time went on.  
The eroding of public morality and solidarity is the primary concern of 
neoconservatives with regard to culture and behavior, and help explain the rise of 
neoconservative thought as a part of traditional conservatism. The decline of morality 
seems to arise not so much as a warning against the horrors of the afterlife as one 
encounters in Christian doctrine, but as a warning against the loosening of societal 
solidarity and strength that results from moral and social ambiguity. In the aptly titled 
“Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship,” Irving Kristol asserts that “in 
[the older idea of democracy], the people took some care not to let themselves be 
governed by the more infantile and irrational parts of themselves.”29 An observer can 
draw the parallel from this idea to the convergence of moral fundamentalism in the 
1980’s; both neoconservatives and evangelicals share the idea of a clean, moralistic 
society, though for different reasons. In the case of neoconservatism, these feelings arise 
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from historical and philosophical notions about the quality of society, though the 
difference with evangelism is tempered by the realization that censorship and regulation 
have the same result whether the imposing ideology has its background in Strauss or the 
Old Testament. In a piece authored by longtime neoconservative activist James Q. 
Wilson, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” the case is made not 
only for increased police patrols, but also for the reassertion of localized control over 
crime and disorder. Wilson supports “citizen action without substantial police 
involvement,”30 along with other such ideas in reference to the idea of citizen militia, a 
traditional second-amendment supported conservative argument. This type of rhetoric 
may be consistent with the Nixon/Eastwood era of law and order, but again suppositions 
are supported by reference to former incarnation of American democracy, namely in 
Wilson’s case that “the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting 
crimes.”31 The reference to the purity of America that is necessary for the propagation of 
neoconservative ideals appears again with Jeane Kirkpatrick who asserts that “As long as 
the United States was perceived as a virtuous society, policies that enhanced American 
power were also seen as virtuous.”32  On the surface these forms of neoconservatism 
would seem to meld together with modern forms of conservatism espoused first by 
Richard Nixon. The difference is simply the academic level at which neoconservatives 
are operating; rather than reactionary diatribes against the morally decadent 1960’s and 
1970’s, these works are informed by philosophical and political notions, absent of 
religion in most cases, about the erosion of American society that can occur as a result of 
                                                 
30 Jame Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” The 
Atlantic Monthly, March 1982.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Neoconservatism as a Response to the Counter Culture,” from The Neocon Reader, 
ed. by Irwin Stelzer (New York: Grove Press 2004). 
 24
allowing various social ills. What these works do show, however, is that neoconservatism 
was not a wholly independent ideology from the increasingly “traditional” conservatism 
of the fundamentalist right, but shares some important ideas that allowed for the 
convergence of conservatism into the apparatus that allowed for the neoconservative-
backed Iraq invasion of 2003.  
It is one of the more puzzling oddities of the modern mélange of today’s 
neoconservatism that its advocates have for the most part held to the positions of the 
radical Christian views that typify the far right, going far beyond the previous 
neoconservative tenets. Previous neoconservative ideas primarily advocated social 
solidarity and public morality in academic terms rather than the abject death of civil 
society that Christian conservatives often proselytize publicly. Often divorcing 
themselves from the academic discourses discussed earlier, post-Reagan 
neoconservatives often find themselves advocating for nearly all of the major tenets of 
conservatism, whether the neoconservative foreign policy or the socially extreme policy 
of Limbaugh and O’Reilly. It is no secret that the Republican Party has a unified nature 
to it that represents its main advantage over the Democratic left. However, issues relating 
to the social permissiveness of abortion, homosexuality, and the advocating of a more 
unified Church and State puzzle when considering how these issues are seemingly 
unrelated to the projection of American government abroad that is the public definition of 
neoconservatism following the invasion of Iraq. This may well be an indication that the 
former leftists that make up neoconservatism are simply not aligned at all with any 
semblance of liberalism that they may have embraced following World War II; however 
the more credible argument is that attaining power for the neoconservative persuasion 
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required alliances with structures and ideologies with broad public appeal. A cursory 
examination of the work by the Project for the New American Century finds no fiery 
works denouncing homosexuality or abortion, an indication that the base of 
neoconservatism does not acknowledge or endorse socially conservative policies at home 
despite the necessity that these policies have had to the end of allowing neoconservative 
foreign policy to rise to the top of U.S. politics. The seeming implausibility of the 
American people electing a party espousing broad theoretical positions about global 
affairs shows that the integration of neoconservatism within the broader modern 
conservative movement was perhaps the foremost reason for the ideology’s rise to power. 
Through analyzing the domestic social aspects of the neoconservatives, the reader can 
glean some sense of the underlying motivations, but the question remains whether these 
older works represent an integrated part of the ideology or the cultural musings of those 
with bigger things on their minds. The modern forms of neoconservativism, maintaining 
focus on the traditional aspects of the ideology, obviously paint a more accurate portrait 
of the present state of neoconservatism than religious fundamentalism. The traditional 
neoconservative form asserted itself in the 1990’s in official capacities, leading to the 
implementation of the ideology’s modern forms.    
 
Modern Incarnations: The 1990’s 
 The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), supervised by Undersecretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, provides a relevant distillation of the actions of the 
neoconservative movement in the past decade and a half, and specifically following the 
Cold War. The document states rhetoric of American primacy and exceptionality that 
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typifies the modern neoconservative: “In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, out overall 
objective is to remain the predominant outside power…and to prevent any hostile power 
from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to generate global 
power.”33 The document, according to the biographer of George W. Bush’s war cabinet, 
James Mann, was in fact not written by Wolfowitz but by Zalmay Khalilzad, an aide to 
Wolfowitz, and a demonstration of the fluidity of the ideology considering how it could 
be attributed to any number of individuals despite its revolutionary considerations. 
Further, as journalist George Packer has asserted, “The DPG was a document of Cold 
Warriors, the hard liners of the 1970’s who rejected accommodation with the Soviet 
Union.”34 The preliminary document was leaked to the New York Times, which 
contributed heavily to the decrease in intensity that market the DPG’s final release. After 
the publishing of preliminary reports, the DPG was “roundly criticized in the [George 
H.W. Bush] White House and in foreign capitals.”35 It seems that the neoconservative 
ideology, as it was taking its 1990’s form, was rejected as being far too extreme in its 
hard-line isolationism to be acceptable in the climate following the disintegration of the 
USSR. Khalilzad’s draft, rewritten by Wolfowitz aide Lewis “Scooter” Libby, 
nonetheless contained “key concepts that others would invoke over the coming years,”36 
according to Mann. The first foray into the neoconservatism that would inform the policy 
in the Middle East to almost exclusive degrees in the coming years was in place in 
official language, and set to be put into action within an undetermined time frame. 
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Following such a vital document was the 1994 Republican Revolution, 
spearheaded by House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Gingrich’s Contract with America, which 
spelled out militarist policies that was “designed to address concerns that readiness [of 
the military] has suffered because defense spending has been cut too far and too quickly 
in order to pay for expensive social programs.”37 This is the primacy theme of modern 
neoconservatism leading up to the Iraq war; the reassertion of the lost focus on military 
readiness, preparedness, and expected dominance as was more the focus when prospects 
for a long apocalyptic war with the USSR were front and center. The document has 
provisions “restricting multi-national and UN control of U.S. troops”38, setting the stage 
for the unilateral invasion of Iraq that would ignore the United Nations and the wishes of 
other nations that were traditional U.S allies. Provisions in the document call for a 
reorganization and reallocation of defense monies: “significant increases in defense 
funding may be necessary in the future to maintain a capable force.”39 Though much of 
this document is in challenge and strategic response to President Bill Clinton, the defense 
portion of the document would seem to have been heavily influenced by neoconservative 
policy hawks, as indicated by their previously described positions on the military. 
Following this, neoconservatives continued their attempts to influence policy through a 
more public channel. 
The establishment of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) codified 
in official letterhead the articulation of neoconservatism (the term is not used by the 
group) in its most modern incarnation, and provides the organized collection of 
                                                 





personalities and ideology that was missing in previous decades. The thinkers and writers 
that comprise this collective are a who’s who of Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush 
Administration figures and confidants. They include Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and 
William Kristol, William Bennett, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and many others.40 
Those knowledgeable of daily political news in recent years are aware of the organization 
and its purported influence. Unfortunately, real examination of the information the group 
has put out is lacking in the extreme. Chaired by William Kristol, the organization’s 
publications span the web of modern media that conservatism has created for itself, 
including the Rupert Murdoch-owned Weekly Standard, and well-placed editorials in 
major national newspapers such as the Washington Post, as evidenced by documentation 
on the group’s web site. The group’s 2000 opus, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, 
crystallizes the views of the modern neoconservative most completely given the breadth 
of the personalities behind its production. The report contains the same military-building 
rhetoric of the Contract with America, with the added emphasis of “performing the 
‘constabulary’ duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical 
regions,” and “fighting and winning multiple, simultaneous major theater wars.”41 The 
directness of such reports and the organized and powerful personalities associated with 
this group underscore its vital importance to modern neoconservatism and policy.  
With such explicit militarism by such influential figures, the connection to Iraq is 
obvious; not only is the theoretical justification present in PNAC reports, but calls for 
specific actions are spelled out. Additionally, the report refers to the goal of the US in the 
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21st century as to preserve “Pax Americana,” and exploiting the transformation of war, 
referring possibly to computerized superiority rather than the foot soldiers currently 
fighting in Iraq. It is important to recognize that this modern incarnation of 
neoconservatism is attacking new problems from a somewhat historical perspective; it’s 
as if these neoconservatives of the early 21st century are referring to what they themselves 
would have advocated as post-Soviet policy during the Cold War years. As such, there is 
a lacking theoretical justification; the goal is simply maintenance of a status quo that sees 
the US in temporary but inevitably declining dominance over world affairs. The problem 
is that the ultimate goal, the ending of Soviet tyranny, has been achieved and replaced 
with the goal of ending tyranny in general and promoting democracy and Americanism 
across the globe, a much larger task. The focus on Iraq following the Gulf War has more 
to do with cleaning up a mess that left the US in a less than totally dominant position over 
Saddam Hussein rather than Iraq being the genuine “worst tyranny” or most critical 
strategic focus. The PNAC published letter to Bill Clinton advocating “a long term goal 
of removing Saddam Hussein from power,”42 shows in its calling for of multilateralism 
and UN cooperation how muddled the Iraq policy in fact was, and how this invasion may 
have spelled the end of effective implementations of neoconservatism. The invasion 
itself, however, may not have been possible absent the rise of conservative media 
informational structures, which gave voice to the ideology as well as instant credibility.    
 
Media as a Forum 
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The role of the mass news media in the rise of neoconservatism has certainly not 
been a small one. This issue has gone largely ignored in relation to its massive cultural 
and political significance, but the media’s shift to the right since the Nixon administration 
has been both demonstrable and quantifiable; coherent articulations of the rise of 
conservative media such as Eric Alterman’s What Liberal Media? and David Brock’s The 
Republican Noise Machine offer, though in a partisan Democrat manner, a history of how 
the media has been co-opted by a collective reaction against the “liberal bias” seemingly 
on full display late in the Vietnam War. Faced with misinformation regarding weapons of 
mass destruction and terrorist connections voluminously confirmed to be false43, the 
cowed “balance” of the media in the case of the Iraq war has led to not only the 
domination of conservative perspectives but to a lack of accountability. The first and 
most basic cause of the failure of the media to recognize the circumstances and situation 
that America found itself in with regard to Iraq is the media itself, and the organizational 
structure of conservatism in general and its demonstrated tendency to integrate 
neoconservatism.    
A holistic analysis of the conservative media can lead to definitive conclusions 
regarding the presence of neoconservative ideology in traditional channels, and such 
informed analysis of evidence leads one to the true role of media in neoconservatism’s 
rise. The Weekly Standard magazine, edited by William Kristol and Fred Barnes, offers a 
modern media vehicle by which the proponents of neoconservatism have achieved their 
stated goal of invading Iraq, and through which an understanding of how the unification 
of media and ideology can bring about such results. The product of Rupert Murdoch’s 
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News Corporation, The Weekly Standard and its journalistic sibling The New York Post, 
not to mention nearly all of talk radio and influential editorial pages nationwide led by 
The Wall Street Journal, offer a supposed conservative counterbalance to the leftist 
mainstream.44 Kristol, the intellectual heir to the mantle of neoconservatism given his 
public face, access, and genealogy, is also a frequent contributor to Murdoch’s Fox News 
Channel. The conservatism and ideological zeal of these structures is well known, 
however when considering the specific principles of neoconservatism, their unity with the 
traditional forces of conservatism can be seen as the primary driving force behind this 
new media dominance.45 The Weekly Standard did not appear on the scene through its 
mantra of finishing off Saddam Hussein as would seem to be the case if one listened to 
the uninformed rants of many on the Left, but was the product of a decades long 
movement of conservative information that had created a niche for neoconservative 
hawks.  Funded by John Olin, Richard Mellon Scaife and other crusty billionaire 
activists46, the right wing ideological machine offered the intensity of domestically 
polarizing morality into the American mindset, and with it came the neoconservatives 
who had attained prominence starting with Nixon and Ford. There may be no large 
“neoconservative media,” but the structures of conservative media are such, that the 
ideology is often given a voice anyway. Neoconservatism’s aforementioned integration 
with conservatism is a primary driver of this informational capability.   
Those deemed the intellectual “neoconservatives” rarely are identified as such in 
the media today; not only do official groups such as PNAC not use the term but a cursory 
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examination of major papers would show a lack of such identification, owing to the 
stigma of the terminology. The direct access of these types of individuals to the channels 
of modern information, however, is not necessarily the point. The media has 
implemented a system in recent history wherein the binary nature of American politics 
has been so ingrained into the consciousness that the alliance of these particular types of 
individuals with the “right” can be seen as the means by which they are able to 
disseminate their ideology, and in their case this ideology is frequently a neoconservative 
one. The organization, funding, and earnestness of the Right in the media is in contrast to 
the disorganized and confused left, evidenced by and cursory look at the content of talk 
radio, television, or newsprint.47  This allows for the inherent imbalance of a discourse 
that only allows for two viewpoints, no matter the positions or qualitative representations. 
The presentation of generally conservative viewpoints leading up to the invasion of Iraq 
often, intentionally or not, brought with them the propagation of the intellectual strategy 
that the removal of Saddam Hussein was vital to American interests no matter the 
rationale for war.48 The continued insistence on this idea despite the contrary evidence 
places such ideology as part of the general position of the Right, and thus the media has 
had an ingrained neoconservative position within nearly all foreign policy debates and 
analyses. 
 
An Informed Perspective: Neoconservatism and Iraq 
 The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was most assuredly a neoconservative act. 
Consistent with Strauss, the intellectual justification was made covertly and with 
                                                 
47Ibid. 
48 Ingrid A Lehmann, “Exploring the Transatlantic Media Divide over Iraq,” Harvard International Journal 
of Press/Politics 10, no. 1 (2005): http://scholar.google.com.    
 33
mendacious information designed to carry out goals with maximum efficacy.49 Consistent 
with cultural policies, it was intended to maximize the presence of American style 
democratic freedom abroad.50 Consistent with Cold War policy of Team B, the planners 
of the war utilized lofty policy positions in order to counter domestic and global 
resistance to its policies and claims.51 These linkages delineate an independent ideology 
that is far more quantifiable than it would initially appear to the modern observer of 
policy schema. Neoconservatism does exist independent of conservatism and the 
separation and classification of it as an ideology is what affords the informed analyst the 
ability to make the connections to Iraq. The connections having been established, 
conclusions can be drawn from this material that illuminates how neoconservatism has 
been affected by events in Iraq, and such an informed perspective attains great value in a 
modern context. 
The Iraq invasion itself, more so than any historical or contextual perspective, is 
becoming the public definition of neoconservatism, despite the complexity of the 
ideology and the realities of its tenets. A highly influential op-ed by the New York Times’ 
resident conservative David Brooks asserts that “if you ever read a sentence that starts 
with “Neocons believe, there is a 99.44 per cent chance that everything else in that 
sentence will be untrue.”52 This idea, albeit in this case a reaction to persistent criticism 
through the use of sarcasm, speaks to the idea of a lack of a cogent and consistent 
neoconservative position. The Iraq war, decidedly unpopular and regarded negatively by 
                                                 
49 Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 
29, no. 1(Summer 2004), http://muse.jhu.edu. 
50 Jay Winik, “The Neoconservative Reconstruction,” Foreign Policy 73 (1988). http://scholar.google.com.  
51 The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear, DVD, Directed by Adam Curtis (London: 
BBC Video, 2004).  
52 David Brooks, “The Neocon Cabal and other Fantasies,” in The Neocon Reader, ed. by Irwin Stelzer, 
(New York: Grove Press, 2004), 41. 
 34
the public,53 has not led to the public blaming of neoconservatives seemingly only 
because of the demonstrated fact that the ideology is not adequately defined publicly. The 
covert nature of neoconservatism, rooted in Straussian thought, perhaps limits the public 
culpability to some degree, however that the Iraq war introduced many to 
neoconservatism for the first time certainly limits the ideology’s efficacy. Iraq, then, is 
the most vital assertion of neoconservatism in its modern form.   
Iraq has become a flashpoint considering that the neoconservative movement is 
tied inextricably to this war. Even many influential Republicans, many of an advanced 
age reared in previous eras, have decried and been nothing less than greatly disturbed by 
the actions of this seeming new guard,54 and even former neoconservative Francis 
Fukuyama has published a book highly critical of the Iraq policy. This intensely 
contentious climate has diluted the conceptual framework of neoconservatism to the point 
where a consistent definition and attendant explanation are elusive absent holistic 
analyses such as the one ostensibly presented here. A significant reason for this, of course 
is the previously demonstrated merger of foreign policy neoconservatism with American 
Christian fundamentalism, and the puzzling confluence of these disparate ideologies. As 
the personalities who plotted Iraq as the next logical step in the making of the “new 
American century” continue to be unavoidably enmeshed in the complex, perhaps 
decades-long process of the reconstruction of that nation, the ability of the movement to 
perpetrate further actual policy or military action will likely be mitigated substantially. 
With the popularity of the War’s advocates in the Bush administration well known, from 
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the previously cited poll and others, political reality with respect to future electoral 
prospects may diminish neoconservatism overall.   
In an academic sense, it may be the case that the Iraq war not only spells the end 
of neoconservatism in a public sense in reference to the possibility of policy 
implementation, but also shows that the parameters of the ideology simply are not 
conducive to application in the modern world. Events since the invasion such as the Abu 
Ghraib disaster and the continued lack of international support55 that was previously 
assumed through the powers of economic and military coercion underscore the fact that, 
following the USSR’s collapse, the United States simply did not slide into the role of the 
only superpower for years to come by default. This is certainly not historically 
unprecedented, as in cases such as Britain’s involvement in the Suez crisis and the French 
in Southeast Asia to cite two relatively recent incidences; however the highly ingrained 
“fact” presented consistently in America that the United States is the world’s sole 
superpower following the Cold War may take some time to untangle. The future of Iraq 
as a nation really is irrelevant to the way neoconservatism is perceived; Robert Kagan 
and William Kristol themselves asserted that the rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure 
is the focus rather than the now discredited reasons for the invasion56, meaning that 
neoconservatism has stepped aside following the invasion as economic forces become the 
focal point. The strategic doctrine of unilateralism implicitly present in documents 
asserting the neoconservative position have been proven to be untenable and unpopular 
given domestic and international distress, and the Bush administration’s insistence on 
                                                 
55Carolyn Skorneck, Nather, David, Schatz, Joseph J., Graham-Silverman, Adam, “Iraq Supplemental Will 
Pass, But Many See Well Going Dry, CQ Weekly 61, no. 37, http://search.epnet.com.  
56 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Right War for the Right Reasons,” The Weely Standard, 
February 27, 2004. 
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referring to the invading force as a “coalition of the willing” is an indication that a public 
strategy of unilateralism is not feasible. In some ways the Bush administration has 
indicated that it is not at all tied at the hip to neoconservatism, as evidenced by William 
Kristol’s criticisms of the Defense Department57, and that if given the opportunity to 
correct its horrendous standing with the public, it will distance itself from its 
neoconservative roots, voluntarily or not.58
 The neoconservative model is expressly based in the Cold War mindset, and it 
may take some time for the realization that this mindset has lost salience to trickle down 
through the intellectual establishment.  This may be an entirely different subject as far as 
explaining adequately how the U.S. has and will continue to lose the power of economics 
and leverage and will deal with this future, but in reference to neoconservatism, it is 
instructive to making an educated guess based on the historical perspective and 
intellectual underpinnings that have led to the current scenarios. The debate about the 
present and immediate future state of the Iraqi people actually is providing something of 
a cover for the real issues facing America, namely those of the ways in which power can 
be projected in the future. Simply letting the process play itself out could and almost 
certainly will result in bloodshed, and thus waiting to for events to determine the course 
is not a part of an intelligent solution. The critical overall importance of fully 
understanding the contextual reasoning and purpose behind neoconservatism is the only 
adequate method that can be used to improve future scenarios of emerging ideologies. 
These ideologies could be classified as those in which a group seemingly comes out of 
                                                 
57 William Kristol, “The Defense Secretary We Have,” Washington Post, December 15, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A132-2004Dec14.html.   
58 Jay Solomon and Neil King, Jr., “As Neocons Leave, Bush Foreign Policy Takes Softer Line,” Wall 
Street Journal, February 6, 2006, p. A1-A17, http://search.epnet.com.  
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nowhere with projections of solutions for the problems of the modern world, something 
of a deus ex machina, whether the problem at hand be authoritarian or totalitarian 
regimes, or other problems. The failure of mankind to recognize the importance of 
context and reasoning on such a consistent basis, however, does not bode well and should 
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